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The economic vote is one of the most accepted theories of political science. 
Studies on the subject have mainly focused on developed democracies, leaving 
aside the effects that economic performance holds in different settings. This 
paper provides further answers by examining the case of Chile. Since 2006, 
Chileans have experienced different economic settings, which include a 
recession and a period of ensuing growth. However, economic performance 
did not translate into support or disapproval for sitting presidents. On the 
contrary, Bachelet’s popularity skyrocketed in the midst of an economic 
crisis, while Piñera’s approval drastically fell when the economy was doing 
well. A similar outcome occurred for views on the government’s economic 
management. Hence, this paper puts forward the hypothesis that—controlling 
by socio demographic, political and economic variables—Chileans were 
limited in discerning between presidential approval and the responsibility for 
economic management between 2006 and 2013. To test this assumption, I 
use survey data from the Centro de Estudios Públicos (CEP) and run logistic 
regression models and predictive margins. Results show that sex, age, region of 
residence and economic outlook explain both types of assessments in a similar 
manner. There are, however, important differences within and between models, 
particularly for the variables socioeconomic status and political ideology.
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Una de estas opiniones es similar a la otra: 
aprobación presidencial y apoyo al manejo 
económico del gobierno en chile, 2006-2013
El voto económico es una de las teorías más aceptadas en la ciencia política. 
Los estudios en la materia se han centrado principalmente en democracias 
desarrolladas, dejando de lado los efectos que el desempeño económico puede 
sostener en distintos escenarios. Este artículo busca entregar nuevos antecedentes 
al examinar el caso de Chile. Desde 2006, el país ha experimentado distintos 
contextos económicos, que incluyen una recesión seguida de un período de 
crecimiento. Sin embargo, el desempeño económico no se tradujo en apoyo o 
rechazo para los presidentes que gobernaban. Al contrario, la popularidad de 
Bachelet aumentó en plena crisis económica, mientras que la aprobación de 
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Piñera experimentó una caída cuando el país crecía. Un resultado similar puede 
ser visto respecto a las opiniones del manejo económico del gobierno. Este 
artículo propone que—controlando por variables socio demográficas, políticas 
y económicas—los chilenos no distinguieron entre la aprobación presidencial 
y el manejo económico entre 2006 y 2013. Para probar lo anterior, utilizo 
datos del Centro de Estudios Públicos (CEP) y empleo modelos de regresión 
logística y efectos marginales. Los resultados demuestran que sexo, edad, 
región de residencia y percepciones económicas explican ambas opiniones de 
manera similar. No obstante, se observan diferencias importantes al analizar las 
opiniones por grupo socioeconómico e ideología.
Palabras clave: Aprobación presidencial, voto económico, manejo económico, 
Chile
Introduction
Research on developed democracies reports that the economy influences political 
outcomes. This effect is of particular importance in democracies, since economic 
performance is commonly linked to accountability. Elected officials know that their 
political fate is generally determined by the economic setting. A good economy 
is associated to macroeconomic stability, including growth, low inflation and 
unemployment rates. Such a situation yields political dividends, which frequently 
translate into the reelection of incumbents or high approval for sitting presidents. 
On the contrary, voters dislike poor economic performance, which tends to be a 
synonym of removal from office or low approval ratings. The economy is a key 
factor through which citizens in democracies “punish bad performance and reward 
good outcomes” (Duch, 2007:803).
The relationship between economic performance and politics can be traced back 
to Downs’ An Economic Theory of Democracy (1957). His theory emphasized the 
rationality behind electoral choice and defined the first notions of the economic 
vote (Fiorina, 1981; Kramer, 1971; Key, 1966). Since then, the economic vote has 
become one of the most accepted theories in political science (Lewis-Beck and 
Paldam, 2000), though it has not been immune to limitations of its own. Research 
on the subject has usually taken on the form of case studies reduced to a small 
number of countries (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2007), and often high-income 
nations (Lewis-Beck and Ratto, 2013; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2008). Hence, the 
true extent of the economic vote remains uncertain in other scenarios, especially in 
the context of emerging democracies.
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A recent wave of studies has sought to fill in this blank. Research has expanded 
to other cases, mainly post-communist Europe and Latin America (Lewis-Beck 
and Stegmaier, 2008; Johnson and Ryu, 2010; Johnson and Schwindt-Bayer, 2009; 
Gélineau, 2007; Benton, 2005; Remmer, 1991). The introduction of new cases has 
led to further methodological challenges and empirical inquiries. Scholars have 
sought to understand the impact that economic performance holds on public 
opinion in developing settings, especially to test if its effects imply the same sources 
of democratic accountability observed for industrialized countries.
Evidence from Chile casts into question some of the basic assumptions of vote-
popularity functions. In 2009, Chile suffered from an economic recession. Though 
the country faced the classical setting in which there should be little backing for 
the sitting president, support for President Michelle Bachelet (2006-2010) reached 
record-breaking numbers, though it was not enough to keep her coalition in office. 
Likewise, approval ratings during Sebastián Piñera’s government (2010-2014) further 
question the influence that the economy holds on local politics. Piñera oversaw 
the resurgence of economic growth. Such an outcome should have translated into 
support for the sitting president. Yet, Piñera’s popularity drastically fell during his 
second year in office. His job approval was one of the worst to ever be recorded 
for a Chilean president (Centro de Estudios Públicos, 2015). In the presidential 
and legislative elections of 2013, his coalition was voted out of executive office and 
reduced to a minority of seats in congress.
The case of Chile questions some basic assumptions of the economic vote. It 
provides examples of a president remaining popular during a recession and of poor 
endorsement resulting from economic growth. However, this does not mean that 
Chileans are unaware of the economic conditions that surround them. Survey data 
suggests that Chileans have well-formed views and that those views vary according 
to the economic setting (Centro de Estudios Públicos, 2015). This paper argues that 
the Chilean case displays particular features commonly found in the literature of 
accountability linked to the concept of ‘clarity of responsibility’ (Anderson, 2000; 
Nickelsburg and Norpoth, 2000; Powell and Whitten, 1993). Hence, Chileans were 
more limited in holding presidents accountable for economic performance between 
2006 and 2013.
A first section of this paper reviews the literature on the economic vote, with a 
special emphasis in developing democracies. Data and method are then defined, 
followed by a series of descriptive statistics that summarize the composition of 
support for presidential approval and government management of the economy 
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during the Bachelet (2006-2009) and Piñera (2010-2013) administrations. A fourth 
section runs logistic regression models for identifying the determinants—socio 
demographic, political and economic variables—that influence public opinion, 
while a final section summarizes results.
1. Theoretical framework, problem and hypothesis
Research has determined that economic performance has a profound impact on 
voters’ perception of government. Voters tend to reward incumbents if the economy 
is doing well. Likewise, voters punish governments in the polls if there is a poor 
economic situation (Fiorina, 1981; Monroe, 1978; Kramer, 1971; Key, 1966).There 
is a similar relationship between economic outlook and job approval for sitting 
presidents (Duch, 2007; Lewis-Beck and Paldam, 2000). Elected officials tend to 
be more popular during positive economic settings, while the contrary is expected 
under weaker scenarios (Lewis-Beck and Paldam, 2000; Erikson, MacKuen and 
Stimson, 2000; Carlsen, 2000; Beck, 1991; Kernell, 1978; Monroe, 1978).
The economic vote has gained widespread acceptance in political science. The 
theory has turned out to be one of the main sources of democratic accountability 
(for comprehensive summaries see Paldam, 2008; Duch, 2007; Lewis-Beck and 
Stegmaier, 2000; Lewis-Beck and Paldam, 2000; Nannestad and Paldam, 1994). 
The literature has produced significant findings that have focused on which 
macroeconomic indicators influence political attitudes (Paldam, 2008; Lewis-Beck 
and Paldam, 2000), the timeframe favored for evaluating economic performance 
(Lewis-Beck, 1988; Fiorina, 1981; Key, 1966) and the type of voting—sociotropic or 
egotropic—that has a greater effect (Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson, 2000; Lewis-
Beck, 1988; Fiorina, 1981; Key, 1966). However, the economic vote has experienced 
constraints of its own. These restrictions can be summarized into problems that 
involve cross-national evidence and the need to expand the focus beyond high-
income nations.
The economic vote is not always stable. Macroeconomic indicators, though 
important, seem to have different effects within and across cases (Lewis-Beck and 
Paldam, 2000). This problem is particularly visible in cross-national studies. As 
argued by Duch (2007:806) “the economic vote varies quite significantly across 
countries, between elections, and even within subgroups of the population”. As a 
result, scholars have tried to provide greater consistency when analyzing the impact 
of economic performance on public opinion (Duch and Stevenson, 2008). A second 
problem is related to the cases that are usually employed. Research has almost always 
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focused on industrialized nations, such as the United States, France and Britain, 
while cross-national studies outside high-income nations are hardly considered 
(Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2000). Thus, the inclusion of other countries is an 
essential component to understand the extent or limits of economic voting.
Since the ‘third wave of democratization’, Latin American countries have sought to 
consolidate democracy while achieving macroeconomic stability (Mainwaring and 
Perez-Linan, 2005). An emerging literature on the economic vote in Latin America 
has been conducted during recent decades (Lewis-Beck and Ratto, 2013; Singer and 
Carlin, 2013; Johnson and Ryu, 2010; Johnson and Schwindt-Bayer, 2009; Gélineau, 
2007; Benton, 2005; Morgan, 2003; Weyland, 2000; Stokes, 1996; Dominguez and 
McCann, 1995; Remmer, 1991). A first series of studies have sought to determine 
how the general notions of the economic vote interact in the Latin American 
context, with a particular emphasis on economic performance and the region’s 
institutional framework. Remmer’s (1991) pioneer analysis of 21 competitive Latin 
American elections between 1982 and 1990 concluded that the economic crisis 
experienced in the eighties resulted in electoral instability and voter turnover 
(Remmer, 1991). Her study established that certain macroeconomic indicators—
variation in exchange rates, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and inflation—hold 
a significant impact on electoral outcomes. Institutional features also matter. Two 
party systems tend to experience less electoral volatility than multiparty systems. 
Benton’s (2005) study of elections across 13 Latin American countries between 
1982 and 2003 determined that the economy is an important factor for shaping 
voter preferences. He distinguished the institutional framework of each case, a point 
previously implied by Remmer (1991). As a result, citizens can hold governments 
accountable for economic performance “only in certain institutional settings” 
(Benton, 2005: 439). This difference depends on the electoral rules. Permissive 
formulas lead to punishment, while restrictive ones constrain it.
Johnson and Ryu (2010) examined 78 presidential elections across 18 countries 
between 1980 and 2006. Their study established that economic growth and inflation 
have a significant impact on electoral outcomes. They used an elaborate approach 
to determine if broken campaign promises translate into democratic accountability. 
Singer and Carlin (2013) conducted a cross-national study of 18 Latin American 
countries between 1995 and 2009. They emphasized the importance of context 
for vote casting. According to the authors, sociotropic perceptions hold a greater 
influence among voters than egotropic ones, though the effect is constrained by each 
country’s level of development; egotropic perceptions tend to prevail in low-income 
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nations, while sociotropic evaluations are more significant in democracies with a 
higher income. Lewis-Beck and Ratto (2013) proposed a general theory to explore 
the influence of economic performance on political preferences, which adapts the 
specifications of Nadeau et al (2013) for the Latin American context. The function 
consists of interrelated variables—socio demographic, political and economic—that 
influence voting for incumbent candidates. Their findings point in the direction that 
sociotropic retrospective perceptions affect the incumbent vote the most.
A second line of research has sought to answer the question about the ‘clarity 
of responsibility’ (Anderson, 2000; Nickelsburg and Norpoth, 2000; Powell and 
Whitten,1993). The argument states that citizens usually identify the president as 
responsible for delivering a good economic situation (Nickelsburg and Norpoth, 
2000). Hence, scholars have sought to determine if Latin Americans are able to 
identify who or what is responsible for their country’s economic performance. This 
question is of particular importance in the region due to the centralized nature of 
presidential democracies (Gélineau, 2007; O’Donnell, 1994). Moreover, the issue 
gains greater relevance since it remains unclear how citizens form their economic 
opinions in the region (Paldam, 2008; Lewis-Beck and Paldam, 2000).
Gélineau’s (2007) examination of Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela reveal that there 
is an effective link between economic performance and opinions for the sitting 
president. A positive economic outlook results in support for incumbent presidents, 
while negative assessments increase the likelihood of disapproval. The author also 
identified a similar effect for vote intention, where respondents attribute greater 
levels of economic responsibility. If the economic setting is good, vote intention 
for incumbent presidents should be higher. However, if a president is not running 
for reelection, respondents have a more difficult time linking economic results to 
other candidacies (Gélineau, 2007). In a similar fashion, Johnson and Schwindt-
Bayer (2009) studied presidential approval in Central America. Their findings reveal 
differences when comparing presidents that hold a majority versus minority of seats 
in Congress. The first benefited more in terms of job approval than the later under 
prosperous economic settings, while minority presidents are less popular when the 
economic situation is bad.
Studies on the economic vote for the Latin American context generally fall in line 
with previous work on industrialized countries. Economic performance is linked to 
political outcomes and is considered a source of democratic accountability. However, 
various issues remain unclear. Further research is needed to identify the specific 
macroeconomic indicators that influence public opinion or how citizens produce 
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information concerning economic performance. Additionally, as vote-popularity 
functions gain ground among developing democracies, it remains uncertain if there 
is an adequate ‘clarity of responsibility’, particularly in presidential regimes with 
multi-party coalition governments. Evidence from Chile—that combines periods of 
bad economic performance and popular presidents and unpopular presidents during 
prosperous settings—defies conventional wisdom. Previous research has established 
that macroeconomic indicators do not hold the expected effect on electoral results 
(Espinoza, Morales and Perelló, 2010; Morales and Sánchez, 2010) and presidential 
approval (Cabezas, 2012). Moreover, the extent to which individuals distinguish 
between presidential responsibilities and economic management remains largely 
unknown. This paper hypothesizes that—controlling by socio demographic, political 
and economic variables—Chileans were limited in discerning between presidential 
approval and support for economic management. The alternative hypothesis is that 
there was an effective difference for each backing. In order to test these propositions, 
regression models focus on presidential approval and support for government 
management of the economy.
2. Macroeconomic performance and presidential popularity 
in Chile: a bounded explanation?
On January 15th 2006, Michelle Bachelet was elected as the Concertacion’s fourth 
consecutive president. Her administration faced problems soon after being sworn 
into office. Starting in April 2006, thousands of secondary students began mobilizing 
to demand educational reform. The government was able to sort out the situation 
after reaching an agreement with the opposition. Positive results then ensued, which 
were reflected upon the president’s 49% average job approval in 2006. However, in 
February 2007, the government implemented a new public transportation system 
in the country’s capital (the Transantiago). It was a major policy failure that caused 
public outrage and discontent towards the president. Bachelet’s popularity crumpled 
and fell to a minimum of 39% as she finished her second year in office.
Fortunately for President Bachelet, things were about to change. A series of welfare 
policies introduced during the first half of her presidency and the suitable damage 
control of her economic team throughout the international crisis of 2008-09, led 
to growing support for her administration. The president’s popularity skyrocketed 
in 2009, reaching record-breaking highs. This rise—observed across all sectors of 
Chilean society, only varying to its extent—took place during an economic recession 
in which GDP growth contracted by 1.0%, while inflation and unemployment rates 
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grew (see Figure 1). Hence, preliminary evidence for Bachelet’s presidency points 
in the direction that her popularity was not necessarily determined by economic 
performance. This statement gains ground when observing macroeconomic 
indicators during her successor’s government.
Sebastián Piñera was the first center-right politician to be elected as president 
of Chile in 52 years. His election put an end to two decades of Concertación 
governments and was met with high expectations. After a positive first year in 
office, Piñera’s government was confronted by new student mobilizations. The 
government’s inability to satisfy demands led to a growing discontent among the 
general population. Piñera’s approval ratings collapsed, being the worst to have been 
registered for an executive-office holder since the country’s transition to democracy. 
Support for Piñera and his government remained low throughout the rest of his 
term, only increasing slightly towards the end of his presidency (see Figure 1).
President Piñera’s popularity was not necessarily determined by economic 
performance. Under Piñera’s presidency, Chile grew at an average rate of 5.2%, 
while inflation and unemployment fell. However, the good economic conditions 
did not translate into support for the sitting president. Quite on the contrary, a clear 
majority of Chileans disapproved of both the president and government. It was the 
opposite setting that took place during Bachelet’s administration, when despite a 
bad economy, the president enjoyed high approval.
Two facts concerning the relationship between economic performance and public 
opinion in Chile must be addressed. First, there is an undeniable relationship 
between presidential approval and support for the government’s management of 
the economy. Both indicators are distributed in a similar manner, though they tend 
to be higher for presidential approval. When presidential job approval is high, so 
is support for the government’s management of the economy. When the sitting 
president has low approval, the same occurs for the government’s economic policies. 
Interestingly, the evolution of both figures seems to be exempt from macroeconomic 
performance, at least for variables such as growth, inflation and unemployment. A 
good economic setting does not necessarily translate into support for the sitting 
president/government, while a poor economic performance does not imply low 
approval ratings.
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A second question is linked to how Chileans perceive economic performance. As 
results suggest, respondents distinguish between good, bad and neutral economic 
scenarios. Neutral opinions tend to prevail among the population, averaging 48% 
during the mentioned timeframe. Negative assessments increased in the months 
before the economic downturn (particularly in 2008), though afterwards they 
fell, even during the harshest months of the recession. Positive opinions are the 
weakest—constantly being outweighed by negative views—and grew slightly 
during the prosperous economic setting between 2010 and 2012. Hence, opinions 
on economic outlook display varying results, even though they appear to be 
influenced to a lesser degree by actual economic performance.
Figure 1 
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3. Data and method
This section of the paper builds upon previous work that focuses on the economic 
vote by using predictors that are known to influence vote-popularity functions 
(Lewis-Beck and Ratto 2013). I examine the determinants of support for presidents 
and government management of the economy through logistic regression models. 
Data comes from the Centro de Estudios Públicos (CEP), a non-governmental 
think tank. 18 national representative surveys conducted from June-July 2006 to 
September-October 2013 have been merged into a single dataset (N=27,057). 
Dependent variables consist of presidential approval and support for government 
management of the economy. Predictors include the sex, age, region of residence, 
socioeconomic status, political ideology and economic outlook of respondents. The 
regression formula is summarized as follows:
SUPPORT = β_0+ β_1 SEX+ β_2 AGE+ β_3 REGION+ β_4 SOCIOECONOMIC 
STATUS+ β_5 IDEOLOGY+ β_6 SOCIOTROPIC+ β_7 SOCIOTROPIC 
PROSPECTIVE+ β_8 EGOTROPIC+ β_9 EGOTROPIC PROSPECTIVE
The dependent variable SUPPORT consists of presidential approval and government 
management of the economy, which takes on the value of 1 if respondents approve 
and 0 if they do not. Socio-demographic, political and economic variables have 
been revised from previous electoral studies (Morales, 2008). The predictor SEX 
is equal to 1 for women and 0 for men. AGE separates respondents into different 
cohorts, which are contrasted to the reference group of individuals aged 55 or 
older. REGION is the place of residence of respondents, taking on the value of 
1 for those who lived in Santiago and 0 for those who resided elsewhere in the 
country. SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS divides respondents into high, middle and 
low groups (the latter being the reference category). POLITICAL IDEOLOGY 
employs the left-right scale. Hence, political preferences are separated into those 
who self-identify with the right, center or left, while those who do not identify 
with the scale are used as the reference group. Predictors SOCIOTROPIC and 
SOCIOTROPIC PROSPECTIVE are perceptions concerning the present and 
future economic situation, in which respondents can state a positive, neutral or 
negative assessment (which is used as the reference group). The same applies for 
variables EGOTROPIC and EGOTROPIC PROSPECTIVE, though they focus 
on the respondents’ personal economic situation.
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3.1 Descriptive evidence
There is a similar distribution of results for the variables sex, age, region of residence 
and economic outlook, while there are significant differences when controlling for 
the socioeconomic status and political ideology (see Figure 2). President Bachelet 
was slightly more popular among women than men, which averaged 54.1% and 
51.7% approval during her term in office, respectively. Results for Piñera exhibited 
the opposite trend. Throughout his presidency, he was more popular among 
men (33%) than women (30%). Support for government management of the 
economy displayed different results. Generally speaking, men almost constantly led 
approval throughout both presidential administrations (2006-2013). Nonetheless, 
preferences were more equally distributed during Bachelet’s term in office (men 
held a mean approval of 46.3% and women of 43.5%). This gap increased during 
Piñera’s presidency, as men supported more of the government’s management of the 
economy than women, with averages of 32.1% and 26.8%, respectively.
Presidential approval and support for government’s handling of the economy 
exhibited similar levels of popularity when controlling by age. However, results are 
more equally distributed across age cohorts for economic management. Bachelet 
was more popular among respondents aged between 25-34 years and 55 or older 
during the first year of her presidency. A similar outcome was observed in 2007, 
where the cohorts aged between 18-24 and 55 or older led her approval ratings. 
Interestingly, the predominance of support from older groups gave way to a balanced 
distribution of results in 2008. Furthermore, this developing trend concluded in the 
growing popularity of Bachelet among younger Chileans during her last year in 
office. Results for Piñera provide additional findings. During the first year, Piñera 
enjoyed from high backing across all age groups, particularly from older cohorts. 
However, starting in 2012 respondents aged 55 years or older led his approval 
ratings. Surprisingly, Piñera’s popularity grew among cohorts 18-24, 25-34 and 35-
54 in his last presidential survey.
There was a similar relationship between age and support for the government’s 
management of the economy. If Bachelet experienced mixed age backing, the 
oldest group was more supportive of her government’s economic policies between 
2006 and 2007. In 2008 approval was more or less equally distributed across all 
cohorts. However, economic management was more popular among cohorts 25-34, 
34-54 and 55 or older in the November-December 2008 survey. The remaining 
measurements show a growth of support in all groups, though respondents aged 
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between 18 and 24 led approval in the last survey. Government management of 
the economy during Piñera’s presidency showed mixed age backing. Support was 
equally distributed in the survey of June-July 2010, similar to the measurement of 
November-December 2010 (with the exception of the youngest cohort). Ensuing 
surveys, particularly those between 2011 and 2012 showed great support from the 
25-34 year old cohort1. Respondents aged 55 or older led approval ratings in the 
surveys of November-December 2012 and July-August 2013, only to be replaced 
by younger groups (between 18-34 years old) in the last survey.
The region of residence exhibited similar results for presidential approval and 
government management of the economy. Approval for both—presidents and 
economic policies—was usually lower in Santiago than elsewhere in Chile. For 
Bachelet, support for the president was higher in Regions (55.4%) than in Santiago 
(49.7%). A similar outcome was observed for Piñera, though there was a smaller 
gap. Piñera held a lower mean approval in Santiago (28.9%) than elsewhere (32.6%). 
Results for government management of the economy followed suit. Economic 
policies were more popular in Regions (46.2%) than in Santiago (42.3%) during 
Bachelet’s presidency, while support was almost equally distributed between 
Santiago (27.8%) and Regions (29.6%) under the Piñera administration. 
Socioeconomic status (SES) and political ideology provide evidence of significant 
change. There was an inverse and later direct relationship between SES and approval. 
Low SES respondents led popularity ratings—for presidential approval and support 
for the government’s handling of the economy—under Bachelet2, while high SES 
respondents did so for Piñera. Bachelet was constantly more popular in the low 
SES group, which held a mean approval of 55.6% during her four-year presidency, 
followed by the middle (51.7%) and high SES groups (38.4%). Piñera was more 
popular among high SES respondents (56.4%), while his backing decreased for 
middle (33.5%) and low SES groups (27%). Meanwhile, support for the government’s 
management of the economy showed mixed results. Low SES respondents led 
support during Bachelet’s first year in office, though preferences where more equally 
distributed in 20073. In June 2008, support was greater among low and middle SES 
groups, and almost equally distributed in the survey of November-December 2008. 
Furthermore, government economic policies had greater support from high SES 
1 Surveys of November-December 2011, April 2012 and July-August 2012.
2 Surveys of June 2007, November-December 2007, and October 2009.
3 The only exception took place in the survey of November-December 2007. The distribution of 
preferences is as follows: Low SES (30.3%), middle SES (31.6%) and high SES (35.4%).
131
Lucas Perelló
Vol. 53, Nº 1, 2015
respondents in May-June 2009, while they were more popular among middle and 
low SES groups in the remaining measurements of 20094. Support did not vary 
much during Piñera’s government. High SES groups constantly led backing for the 
government’s handling of the economy (58%), followed by middle (32.3%) and low 
SES groups (23.4%).
Ideological preferences drastically changed between governments. Bachelet was 
supported the most by respondents that identified with the left (75.8%). Further 
behind were those that identified with the center (58.4%), expressed no ideology 
(45.8%) or adhered to the right (36.2%). Interestingly, due to the sharp differences 
that exist when controlling for political ideology, support grew across all groups 
during Bachelet’s last year in office5. The opposite can be seen for Piñera. He was 
constantly backed more by respondents that identified with the right (72.5%), 
while support drastically decreased among center-leaning (36.1%), non-ideological 
(25.4%) and leftist groups (12.3%). There were no significant differences for the 
government’s management of the economy. The main variation is that support 
was lower in comparison to presidential approval. Thus, economic policies were 
more popular among leftist respondents under Bachelet (64.2%), followed by center 
(49.1%), non-ideological (37.7%) and right-leaning groups (32.2%). Under Piñera, 
on the other hand, economic policies were backed by right-leaning respondents 
(67.5%), more than those in the center (34.8%), the non-ideological (22.4%) and 
left-leaning respondents (13.7%).
Economic outlook presents interesting results. Respondents that considered their 
personal and societal (present and prospective) situation as being better showed more 
support for presidents and government policies. Starting with sociotropic views, 
respondents that thought the situation as being better averaged 62.3% presidential 
approval between 2006 and 2013 (with means of 69.8% for Bachelet and 54.7% for 
Piñera). Respondents that judged the context as being the same (43.9%) or worse 
(29.1%) were more critical of the president—though Bachelet was more popular 
across both categories than Piñera. A similar outcome can be seen for government 
management of the economy. Respondents with a positive outlook had a mean 
approval of 60.1%, followed by those with a neutral (37.8%) and negative (14.7%) 
4 Surveys of August and October 2009.
5 In the survey of October 2009 left-leaning respondents (93.9%) were followed by center (85.6%), 
non-ideological (73.3%) and right-leaning groups (64.4%).
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assessment6. Sociotropic prospective opinions fell in line with what was previously 
discussed, despite the exceptions of the July-August and September-October 2013 
surveys. Thus, presidential backing was greater among respondents that considered 
the future situation as being better, with a mean of 60.6% support. Meanwhile, the 
groups that thought it would remain the same averaged 36.5% approval, followed 
by those who thought it was worse with 30.2%. Results are consistent for the 
government’s handling of the economy (see Figure 2).
Egotropic present and prospective7 views fall in line with sociotropic findings. 
Presidential approval and support for the government’s management of the economy 
was greater among respondents that judged their situation as being better, followed 
by those who considered it the same or worse. Additionally, egotropic prospective 
assessments displayed similar outcomes. The backing for both presidents and economic 
policies was greater among respondents with a positive economic outlook, followed 
by those with a neutral and pessimistic view. Different results are present for Piñera, as 
shown in the July-August and September-October 2013 surveys.
6 Bachelet had a mean approval of 65.1% among respondents that considered the situation to be 
better, followed by those who thought it was the same (47.2%) or worse (32.8%). Piñera had lower 
approval across respondents that considered it better (55.2%), same (28.5%) or worse (13.3%).
7 Egotropic data for Bachelet runs from November-December 2007 to October 2009.
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Figure 2 
Job approval by selected indicators, 2006-2013 (%).
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Source: Author’s elaboration of data from www.cepchile.cl
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Figure 2 
(continued) Job approval by selected indicators, 2006-2013 (%).
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Figure 2 
(continued). Job approval by selected indicators, 2006-2013 (%).
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Source: Author’s elaboration of data from www.cepchile.cl
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Figure 2 
(continued) Job approval by selected indicators, 2006-2013 (%).
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Figure 2  
(continued). Job approval by selected indicators, 2006-2013 (%).
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Source: Author’s elaboration of data from www.cepchile.cl
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Figure 2 
(continued) Job approval by selected indicators, 2006-2013 (%).
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Figure 2 
(continued) Job approval by selected indicators, 2006-2013 (%).
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Figure 2 
(continued) Job approval by selected indicators, 2006-2013 (%).
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Figure 2 
(continued) Job approval by selected indicators, 2006-2013 (%).
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3.3 Inferential analysis
This paper uses logistic regression models to compare the determinants of 
presidential approval and support for the government’s management of the economy. 
The models are divided by each presidential term. Hence, there are four models 
that range from 2006 to 2013 (two for each government). Dependent variables 
are presidential approval and government management of the economy, while 
predictors consist of the respondents’ sex, age, region of residence, socioeconomic 
status, political ideology and economic outlook. Tables 1-4 summarize those results.
3.4 Regression results for Michelle Bachelet (2006-2009)
Logistic regression outputs for President Bachelet establish that sex was an important 
predictor in explaining presidential approval. The effect was significant between 
2007 and 2009. Women were more likely of approving the president than men. 
As seen in Table 1, women had a minimum of 24% (β= .21, p≤0.1) and maximum 
of 50% more odds (β= .40, p≤0.01) than men of approving Bachelet. However, in 
support of the government’s economic management, the sex predictor failed to be 
statistically significant during the same time period.
Presidential and government approval were greater among older respondents in 
comparison to all other age cohorts. The output for 2006 showed similar results 
for both dependent variables. Respondents aged between 18 and 24 years old 
had 41% fewer odds of approving Bachelet (β= –.52, p≤0.01) than the reference 
category of individuals aged 55 or older. The remaining groups also displayed 
negative coefficients. The 25-34 years old cohort was 25% less likely (β= –.28, 
p≤0.05), while those 35-54 had 35% fewer odds for approving of the president (β= 
–.43, p≤0.01). A similar outcome was observed for government management of the 
economy in 2006. Respondents aged between 18 and 24 had 42% fewer odds of 
approving the government’s handling of the economy than those aged 55 or older 
(β= –.55, p≤0.01). Likewise, individuals aged between 25 and 34 (β= –.40, p≤0.01), 
and the 35-54 years old group (β= –.36, p≤0.01) were less likely to approve of 
the government’s economic management than the reference group. Results began 
to change in 2007, as the age predictor lost explanatory power for presidential 
approval. Respondents aged between 18-24 years old were not statistically different 
from the reference category, while the 25-34 (β= –.35, p≤0.1) and 35-54 (β= –.42, 
p≤0.01) cohorts had fewer odds to approve of the president. This was not the case 
for opinions on the government’s management of the economy, since all categories 
were statistically significant. The youngest cohort was 30% less likely to approve of 
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the government’s handling of the economy (β= –.35, p≤0.1). A similar result was 
also observed for respondents aged between 25 and 34 (β= –.68, p≤0.01) and 35-54 
years old (β= –.44, p≤0.01). Regression results for 2008 confirm the predominance 
of the age predictor for government management of the economy over presidential 
approval (see Tables 1 and 2). When it came to approving of Bachelet, only the 
respondents aged between 18-24 years old were statistically significant and less 
likely to do so (β= –.36, p≤0.05). Meanwhile, opinions about the government’s 
management of the economy confirmed that the young cohort had a more critical 
attitude towards the government (β= –.45, p≤0.01). This significant relationship 
decreased for respondents aged between 25-34 years old, which had 28% fewer 
odds of approval than the reference group (β= –.33, p≤0.05). In 2009 age was 
not significant, which is interpreted here as a consequence of Bachelet’s growing 
popularity across all cohorts.
The region of residence showed less support for both dependent variables from 
respondents in Santiago in comparison to those who lived in the rest of the country. 
Interestingly, the predictor was significant for both dependent variables on the same 
years (2006-2008), only varying in their overall explanatory power. Starting in 2006, 
respondents that lived in Santiago were 21% less likely to approve of Bachelet than 
those from regions (β= –.23, p≤0.01). Likewise, respondents that resided in Santiago 
had 15% fewer odds to approve of the government’s management of the economy 
in comparison to the reference category (β= –.16, p≤0.1). This gap grew in 2007 
and peaked in 2008, when respondents from Santiago had 37% (β= –.46, p≤0.01) 
and 33% (β= –.39, p≤0.01) fewer odds to support the president and economic 
management respectively. The predictor was not significant for the last year of the 
Bachelet administration.
Regression coefficients confirmed significant socioeconomic differences for both 
dependent variables. Respondents with a low SES backed the president and the 
government’s economic management the most in comparison to middle and high 
SES groups. However, the predictor had a stronger effect for presidential approval and 
not for the government’s management of the economy. Starting in 2006, middle SES 
respondents were 33% less likely to approve of Bachelet than the lower SES reference 
group (β= –.39, p≤0.01). This outcome grew among the high SES group, which 
displayed 58% fewer odds (β= –.87, p≤0.01). Nonetheless, the variable lost explanatory 
power when respondents were asked to evaluate the government’s economic policies. 
Respondents with a high SES failed to be statistically significant, while middle SES 
respondents were 29% less likely to demonstrate support in comparison to the low 
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SES group (β= –.33, p≤0.01). In 2007—when popularity ratings were at their lowest 
point—only high SES respondents were significant for presidential approval (β= 
–1.26, p≤0.01). Furthermore, there were no statistically significant differences for the 
government’s management of the economy. In 2008, the socioeconomic predictor 
regained explanatory power. The middle SES group was 35% less likely to approve 
of Bachelet than the reference category (β= –.42, p≤0.01), while respondents with a 
high SES had even fewer odds (β= –1.16, p≤0.01). A similar result was seen for the 
government’s management of the economy, as middle SES (β= –.23, p≤0.05) and 
the high SES group (β= –.50, p≤0.1) had fewer odds to approve of the government’s 
action when compared to low SES respondents. A similar outcome was seen during 
the last year of Bachelet for both dependent variables.
Respondents that self-identified with the left of the ideological scale constantly 
approved more of the president and the government’s economic policies. A similar 
outcome can be observed among center-leaning respondents, though to a more 
limited extent. Meanwhile, respondents that self-identified with the right almost 
always showed significant negative opinions. Starting in 2006, support for Bachelet 
increased among respondents that self-identified with the left (β= 1.18, p≤0.01) 
or center (β= .43, p≤0.01), while decreasing among the right (β= –.37, p≤0.01). 
When it came to evaluate the government’s economic management, there were 
no significant differences between respondents that self-identified with the right 
and those that did not identify on the ideological scale. Nonetheless, those who 
identified with the center were 56% more likely to approve of the government’s 
economic policies in comparison to the reference group (β= .44, p≤0.01), a result 
that increased by a factor of 2.8 among left-leaning groups (β= 1.03, p≤0.01). 
A similar outcome is observed for 2007. The main difference being that centrist 
respondents were not statistically different—according to both models—from the 
non-ideological reference group. In 2008, the ideological predictor was highly 
significant. While the odds to approve of the president were negative among right-
leaning groups (β= –.51, p≤0.01), it was positive for center (β= .45, p≤0.01) and 
left-leaning respondents (β= 1.16, p≤0.01). Results for 2009 are not much of a 
surprise. The right-leaning group was persistent in being critical of Bachelet (β= 
–.49, p≤0.01), while the centrists had greater odds of approving of Bachelet (β= .68, 
p≤0.01). Those odds grew by a factor of 4.8 among the left (β= 1.57, p≤0.01). This 
outcome can also be seen for government management of the economy. Right-
leaning respondents had 34% fewer odds of supporting government action than 
those without a political ideology (β= –.41, p≤0.01), while centrist (β= .44, p≤0.01) 
and leftist groups (β= .91, p≤0.01) were more likely of doing so.
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Economic outlook showed important differences between sociotropic and egotropic 
opinions. Support for the president and the government’s management of the 
economy was greater among respondents with positive or neutral views and lower 
among those with negative assessments. Starting with the sociotropic predictor 
in 2006, respondents with neutral (β= .47, p≤0.01) or positive (β= .96, p≤0.01) 
attitudes were more likely to approve of Bachelet than the reference group. This was 
also the case for the government’s management of the economy. Respondents that 
considered the situation as being the same had 48% greater odds to approve of the 
government’s handling (β= .39, p≤0.01) than the group with a negative outlook. 
Meanwhile, support grew by a factor of 2.8 among respondents with a positive view 
(β= 1.03, p≤0.01). A similar trend was observed from 2007 to 2009. Presidential 
backing and support for the government’s management of the economy were higher 
among respondents with a neutral or positive outlook, though the predictor had 
greater explanatory power for the government’s economic policies. Additionally, 
a matching trend is observed for sociotropic prospective opinions, particularly 
between 2006 and 2007. However, the predictor provides limited results, since there 
were no significant differences between neutral and negative opinions for years 
2008 and 2009, while the coefficients for positive views decreased through time.
Egotropic outlook behaved in a similar way as the sociotropic variables, though 
to a more limited extent. Presidential approval and support for the government’s 
management of the economy were greater among respondents with a positive 
or neutral assessment. In 2007, the predictor was not significant. Yet, in 2008, 
respondents that considered their personal situation as being the same were 24% 
more likely to approve of the president than those with a negative opinion (β= .21, 
p≤0.05). Likewise, the group with a positive assessment displayed 33% greater odds 
than the reference category (β= .28, p≤0.05). The regression output for government 
management of the economy fell in line with previous results. In 2008, respondents 
with a neutral (β= .19, p≤0.1) or positive opinion (β= .41, p≤0.01) were more 
likely to approve of the government’s economic policies than those with a negative 
assessment. However, in 2009 there were no significant differences between groups 
for measuring presidential approval and support for economic management. 
Egotropic prospective views exhibited a better fit for presidential approval. Neutral 
opinions were significant across all years, as was the case of positive assessments with 
the exception of 2007. The predictor provided limited findings for the government’s 
management of the economy, being significant for the neutral category between 
2006 and 2007, and the positive category from 2006 to 2009.
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Table 1 
Logistic regression model for presidential approval, 2006-2010.
Predictors
2006 2007 2008 2009
Logit coeff Odds ratio Logit coeff Odds ratio Logit coeff Odds ratio Logit coeff Odds ratio
Sex
(Men)
Women
0.125 1.133 0.213* 1.237* 0.405*** 1.499*** 0.398*** 1.489***
(0.0884) (0.100) (0.128) (0.158) (0.0896) (0.134) (0.0786) (0.117)
 
 
Age
(55+)
 
 
18-24
-0.527*** 0.591*** 0.0589 1.061 -0.368** 0.692** 0.198 1.219
(0.146) (0.0860) (0.204) (0.217) (0.146) (0.101) (0.137) (0.167)
25-34
-0.284** 0.753** -0.356* 0.700* -0.185 0.831 0.177 1.194
(0.127) (0.0956) (0.188) (0.131) (0.130) (0.108) (0.118) (0.141)
35-54
-0.433*** 0.648*** -0.425*** 0.654*** -0.0479 0.953 -0.0177 0.982
(0.107) (0.0695) (0.154) (0.101) (0.106) (0.101) (0.0923) (0.0907)
Region
(Others)
Santiago
-0.232*** 0.793*** -0.344*** 0.709*** -0.461*** 0.630*** 0.0439 1.045
(0.0875) (0.0694) (0.129) (0.0912) (0.0896) (0.0565) (0.0799) (0.0835)
 
SES
(Low)
 
 
 
Middle
-0.394*** 0.675*** -0.208 0.813 -0.429*** 0.651*** -0.374*** 0.688***
(0.0884) (0.0596) (0.131) (0.106) (0.0911) (0.0593) (0.0819) (0.0564)
High
-0.873*** 0.418*** -1.264*** 0.283*** -1.116*** 0.328*** -1.263*** 0.283***
(0.258) (0.108) (0.363) (0.103) (0.293) (0.0959) (0.174) (0.0491)
Right
-0.370*** 0.691*** -0.535*** 0.585*** -0.516*** 0.597*** -0.492*** 0.612***
(0.131) (0.0906) (0.178) (0.104) (0.128) (0.0762) (0.0933) (0.0571)
Ideology
(None)
 
 
Center
0.430*** 1.537*** 0.119 1.127 0.457*** 1.579*** 0.687*** 1.987***
(0.110) (0.169) (0.191) (0.215) (0.127) (0.201) (0.128) (0.254)
Left
1.187*** 3.276*** 1.068*** 2.909*** 1.167*** 3.213*** 1.576*** 4.838***
(0.117) (0.384) (0.159) (0.464) (0.112) (0.361) (0.134) (0.647)
 
Sociotropic
(Worse)
 
Same
0.478*** 1.613*** 0.566*** 1.761*** 0.688*** 1.989*** 0.428*** 1.535***
(0.0967) (0.156) (0.147) (0.260) (0.0967) (0.192) (0.100) (0.154)
Better
0.969*** 2.635*** 1.122*** 3.070*** 1.537*** 4.651*** 0.962*** 2.618***
(0.135) (0.356) (0.208) (0.637) (0.155) (0.719) (0.147) (0.384)
 
Sociotropic pro
(Worse)
 
Same
0.606*** 1.833*** 0.718*** 2.051*** 0.106 1.112 -0.0473 0.954
(0.143) (0.262) (0.205) (0.421) (0.103) (0.114) (0.133) (0.127)
Better
1.742*** 5.707*** 1.452*** 4.272*** 0.957*** 2.603*** 0.564*** 1.758***
(0.160) (0.912) (0.236) (1.006) (0.138) (0.360) (0.141) (0.249)
 
Egotropic
(Worse)
 
Same
. . 0.0895 1.094 0.218** 1.244** -0.0127 0.987
. . (0.159) (0.174) (0.105) (0.131) (0.105) (0.103)
Better
. . 0.170 1.186 0.287** 1.333** 0.0555 1.057
. . (0.207) (0.245) (0.142) (0.189) (0.148) (0.156)
 
Egotropic pro
(Worse)
 
Same
0.498*** 1.645*** 0.442* 1.556* 0.305** 1.357** 0.326** 1.385**
(0.149) (0.244) (0.247) (0.384) (0.127) (0.172) (0.151) (0.209)
Better
0.710*** 2.033*** 0.424 1.528 0.459*** 1.583*** 0.503*** 1.654***
(0.164) (0.333) (0.261) (0.399) (0.144) (0.228) (0.158) (0.262)
Constant (0.198)
-1.631*** 0.196*** -1.980*** 0.138*** -1.423*** 0.241*** -0.234 0.791
(0.0387) (0.310) (0.0427) (0.163) (0.0393) (0.193) (0.152)
Observations 2,851 2,851 1,358 1,358 2,721 2,721 3,976 3,976
Pseudo r2 0.176 0.176 0.143 0.143 0.141 0.141 0.125 0.125
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Author’s elaboration of data from www.cepchile.cl
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Table 2 
Logistic regression model for government management of the economy, 2006-2009.
Predictors
2006 2007 2008 2009
Logit coeff
Odds 
ratio
Logit coeff Odds ratio Logit coeff Odds ratio Logit coeff Odds ratio
Sex
(Men)
Women
0.0190 1.019 0.0917 1.096 0.0302 1.031 0.0598 1.062
(0.0870) (0.0886) (0.133) (0.145) (0.0928) (0.0956) (0.0715) (0.0759)
 
 
Age
(55+)
 
 
18-24
-0.551*** 0.576*** -0.357* 0.700* -0.452*** 0.637*** -0.0591 0.943
(0.144) (0.0828) (0.214) (0.150) (0.154) (0.0980) (0.121) (0.114)
25-34
-0.409*** 0.664*** -0.684*** 0.505*** -0.330** 0.719** -0.0507 0.951
(0.125) (0.0832) (0.200) (0.101) (0.138) (0.0989) (0.106) (0.101)
35-54
-0.369*** 0.692*** -0.447*** 0.640*** -0.101 0.904 0.0269 1.027
(0.105) (0.0729) (0.160) (0.102) (0.111) (0.100) (0.0851) (0.0874)
Region
(Others)
Santiago
-0.160* 0.852* -0.256* 0.774* -0.395*** 0.674*** 0.0485 1.050
(0.0867) (0.0739) (0.136) (0.105) (0.0949) (0.0639) (0.0728) (0.0764)
 
SES
(Low)
 
 
 
Middle
-0.337*** 0.714*** -0.205 0.815 -0.234** 0.791** -0.272*** 0.762***
(0.0874) (0.0624) (0.138) (0.112) (0.0961) (0.0760) (0.0741) (0.0565)
High
-0.341 0.711 -0.251 0.778 -0.509* 0.601* -0.564*** 0.569***
(0.245) (0.174) (0.327) (0.255) (0.287) (0.172) (0.166) (0.0946)
Right
-0.136    0.873 -0.399** 0.671** -0.374*** 0.688*** -0.419*** 0.658***
(0.131) (0.115) (0.190) (0.127) (0.139) (0.0957) (0.0902) (0.0593)
Ideology
(None)
 
 
Center
0.446*** 1.563*** 0.198 1.219 0.272** 1.312** 0.445*** 1.561***
(0.111) (0.173) (0.200) (0.244) (0.136) (0.179) (0.113) (0.176)
Left
1.034*** 2.812*** 0.908*** 2.478*** 0.909*** 2.481*** 0.911*** 2.487***
(0.113) (0.318) (0.162) (0.402) (0.113) (0.280) (0.101) (0.251)
 
Sociotropic
(Worse)
 
Same
0.390*** 1.477*** 0.739*** 2.094*** 0.838*** 2.313*** 0.433*** 1.542***
(0.0970) (0.143) (0.161) (0.337) (0.103) (0.239) (0.0919) (0.142)
Better
1.035*** 2.816*** 1.544*** 4.682*** 1.525*** 4.594*** 0.982*** 2.671***
(0.131) (0.369) (0.214) (1.003) (0.151) (0.693) (0.131) (0.349)
 
Sociotropic pro
(Worse)
 
Same
0.594*** 1.812*** 0.492** 1.635** 0.146 1.157 0.0221 1.022
(0.149) (0.271) (0.218) (0.357) (0.112) (0.130) (0.123) (0.126)
Better
1.530*** 4.617*** 1.248*** 3.482*** 0.865*** 2.374*** 0.629*** 1.876***
(0.163) (0.750) (0.245) (0.853) (0.141) (0.334) (0.129) (0.243)
 
Egotropic
(Worse)
 
Same
. . -0.0795 0.924 0.199* 1.220* 0.0618 1.064
. . (0.170) (0.157) (0.114) (0.139) (0.0952) (0.101)
Better
. . 0.132 1.141 0.414*** 1.513*** 0.197 1.218
. . (0.214) (0.244) (0.148) (0.224) (0.132) (0.161)
 
Egotropic pro
(Worse)
 
Same
0.638*** 1.893*** 0.724*** 2.062*** 0.193 1.213 0.104 1.110
(0.156) (0.295) (0.281) (0.579) (0.139) (0.169) (0.143) (0.159)
Better
0.832*** 2.299*** 0.773*** 2.167*** 0.392** 1.480** 0.251* 1.286*
(0.169) (0.389) (0.293) (0.635) (0.155) (0.229) (0.149) (0.191)
Constant (0.207)
-1.949*** 0.142*** -2.401*** 0.0906*** -1.818*** 0.162*** -0.357** 0.699**
(0.0294) (0.346) (0.0314) (0.178) (0.0288) (0.181) (0.127)
Observations 2,851 2,851 1,358 1,358 2,721 2,721 3,976 3,976
Pseudo r2 0.149 0.149 0.145 0.145 0.125 0.125 0.0856 0.0856
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Author’s elaboration of data from www.cepchile.cl
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3.5 Regression results for Sebastián Piñera (2010-2013)
Logistic regressions for Piñera’s term in office showed that sex was not an important 
predictor for explaining presidential approval or support for the government’s 
handling of the economy between 2010 and 2013. The only exception takes place 
for the second model in 2011, where women had 16% fewer odds than men to 
approve of the government’s economic management (β= –.17, p≤0.05).
Results show that support for both dependent variables was greater among the 
oldest age cohort. However, the variable was not always significant, as seen in 
models for 2010 and 2013. Starting in 2010, the only category that was statistically 
significant in explaining presidential approval and support for the government’s 
management of the economy were respondents aged between 18 and 24, which 
were 34% (β= –.40, p≤0.01) and 31% (β= –.37, p≤0.05) less likely to approve in 
comparison to the reference group. The variable gained greater explanatory power 
in 2011, which coincides with the fall of presidential and government approval. 
Respondents aged 18-24 years old had 45% fewer odds to approve of the president 
than the reference category (β= –.58, p≤0.01). A similar outcome was observed 
for respondents aged between 25 and 34 (β= –.32, p≤0.05) and the 35-54 year 
old group (β= –.43, p≤0.01). The age groups had the same trends when assessing 
support for the government’s management of the economy. Respondents aged 
between 18-24 years old were 41% less likely to approve of government action than 
those aged 55 or older (β= –.52, p≤0.01). This was also the case for respondents aged 
between 25 and 34 (β= –.35, P≤0.05) and 35-54 years old (β= –.39, p≤0.01), being 
30% and 33% less likely, respectively. In 2012, all age cohorts—across both models—
had numbers that were statistically significant. Respondents between 18-24 years 
old were 38% less likely to approve of the president (β= –.47, p≤0.01), as were 
the cohorts of individuals aged 25-34 (β= –.44, p≤0.01) and 35-54 years old (β= 
–.43, p≤0.01). Meanwhile, the government’s economic policies continued to be less 
popular in younger cohorts. The youngest group had 36% fewer odds of displaying 
approval (β= –.44, p≤0.01), a similar outcome took place for those between 25 and 
34 (β= –.38, p≤0.01) and 35-54 years old (β= –.25, p≤0.01). The age predictor lost 
statistical significance during Piñera’s last year in office. The only cohort that was 
significant were respondents aged between 35-54 years old, which had 19% (β= 
–.20, p≤0.1) and 24% (β= –.27, p≤0.05) fewer odds to approve of the president and 
economic management, respectively.
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The region of residence was an important determinant of support. Respondents 
from Santiago were less likely to support the president and the government’s 
economic policies than those who lived elsewhere. Starting in 2010, respondents 
from Santiago were 29% less likely to approve of Piñera than those who lived 
elsewhere (β= –.34, p≤0.01). Additionally, respondents that lived in Santiago were 
17% less likely to support the government’s management of the economy (β= –.18, 
p≤0.1). This gap grew over the following years. In 2011 respondents that resided in 
Santiago were 22% less likely to approve of Piñera than their regional counterparts 
(β= –.25, p≤0.05). Meanwhile, those who resided in Santiago had 30% fewer odds 
to approve of the government’s economic management (β= –.35, p≤0.01). In 2012, 
the predictor was only significant for presidential approval, as the residents from 
Santiago had 17% fewer odds to approve of the president than those who lived 
elsewhere (β= –.18, p≤0.05). This outcome grew to 21% fewer odds for Piñera’s last 
year in office (β= –.23, p≤0.05).
The socioeconomic predictor showed distinct results. High SES respondents 
had greater odds to approve of Piñera, while the middle SES group was more 
consistent for the government’s management of the economy. In 2010, the variable 
failed to be significant for presidential approval, though the middle SES displayed 
greater odds of support for the government’s management of the economy (β= 
.20, p≤0.05). In 2011, the predictor gained significance for presidential approval, 
as high SES respondents were 77% more likely to approve of Piñera than the low 
SES group (β= .56, p≤0.05). However, the SES predictor had greater explanatory 
power for economic management. The middle SES group had 28% greater odds of 
displaying support (β= .24, p≤0.05), which grew by a factor of 2.2 among high SES 
respondents (β= .81, p≤0.01). The SES variable was not statistically significant for 
explaining presidential approval in 2012, though differences persisted for government 
management of the economy. Support for the government’s policies grew by a factor 
of 2.1 among high SES respondents in comparison to the reference group (β= .74, 
p≤0.01). Interestingly, in 2013 the socioeconomic variable gained significance for 
presidential approval and lost it for economic management. The middle SES group 
was 30% more likely to approve of Piñera than low SES respondents (β= .26, 
p≤0.01). This was also the case for the high SES group, which displayed 84% greater 
odds (β= .61, p≤0.1). Meanwhile, the government’s economic management was 
only significant among middle SES respondents, which were 45% more likely to 
express support in comparison to the reference group (β= .37, p≤0.01).
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Ideologically speaking, results established that Piñera was more popular among 
respondents that self-identified with the right and—to a lesser extent—the center. 
The group that identified with the left was more critical. These opinions were 
similarly distributed for the government’s management of the economy. Starting 
in 2010, right-leaning respondents led support for Piñera (β= 1.61, p≤0.01), 
followed by centrists (β= .45, p≤0.01), while respondents that identified with the 
left had 53% fewer odds to approve of Piñera than the reference category (β= 
–.76, p≤0.01). Furthermore, the right-leaning group showed greater support for the 
government’s economic policies (β= 1.4, p≤0.01), similar to those that identified 
with the center (β= .35, p≤0.01). Meanwhile, the left-leaning group demonstrated 
a critical attitude (β= –.45, p≤0.01). In 2011, support for the president grew by a 
factor of 4.4 among respondents that identified with the right (β= 1.49, p≤0.01). 
Center-leaning respondents had 46% greater odds for approving of Piñera than 
those without an ideology (β= .37, p≤0.05), while respondents that identified with 
the left were less likely of doing so (β= –1.39, p≤0.01). That same year support 
for the government’s economic management was greater among right-leaning (β= 
1.63, p≤0.01) and centrist groups (β= .66, p≤0.01), whereas left-leaning respondents 
were less likely of displaying approval (β= –.81, p≤0.01). Regression coefficients for 
2012 fell in line with previous results. During Piñera’s last year in office, support for 
the president peaked among respondents that identified with the right (β= 2.25, 
p≤0.01), while he also benefited from greater backing among centrists (β= .40, 
p≤0.01). Leftists, once again, were less likely to approve of the president (β= –.79, 
p≤0.01). The ideological predictor was also significant for economic management. 
Respondents that self-identified with the right had greater odds for approving of 
the government’s action (β= 1.98, p≤0.01), which can also be seen among centrist 
respondents (β= .64, p≤0.01), whereas the group that self-identified with the left 
was less likely to express support (β= –.78, p≤0.01).
Economic outlook behaved in a similar manner as seen between 2006 and 2009. 
Support for the president was greater among respondents with neutral and positive 
views in comparison to those with a negative assessment. At the same time, sociotropic 
opinions outweighed egotropic ones. Starting in the year 2010, respondents that 
defined the sociotropic context as being the same were 46% more likely to back 
Piñera (β= .37, p≤0.01). The odds of support increased among respondents with 
positive opinions, which grew by a factor of 2.7 in comparison to the reference 
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group (β= 1.0, p≤0.01). Respondents with neutral attitudes had 51% greater odds 
of supporting government action than those with a pessimistic attitude (β= .41, 
p≤0.01), which was also the case for respondents with a positive view (β= 1.0, 
p≤0.01). A similar distribution of results took place between 2011 and 2013. On the 
one hand, neutral opinions displayed varied levels of support in comparison to the 
group with a negative assessment (growing between 2012 and 2013, and decreasing 
in 2011). On the other, positive outlooks grew and peaked—in both models—
during Piñera’s last year. Similar trends can be observed for sociotropic prospective 
views. However, the variable is less significant in 2010 and 2011, whereas support 
proved to be greater among respondents with a negative assessment in 2013.
Overall, egotropic outlook was a weak predictor. Results exhibited greater backing 
for the president and the government’s management of the economy among 
respondents with neutral or positive opinions. In 2010, respondents who thought 
that their personal economic situation was the same were 30% more likely to approve 
of the president than those with a negative assessment (β= .26, p≤0.05), while 
those with a positive outlook had 46% greater odds (β= .38, p≤0.05). Egotropic 
perceptions were less relevant for the government’s management of the economy, 
which was only significant for respondents with a positive view (β= .40, p≤0.01). 
All categories were statistically significant in 2011 for presidential approval, whereas 
only the group with a positive outlook helped explain support for the government’s 
economic policies (β= .73, p≤0.01). The predictor was particularly weak in 2012, 
while in 2013 it was only significant for government management of the economy. 
Meanwhile, egotropic prospective opinions were the poorest predictor across both 
models.
Results show that there were significant SES and ideological differences between 
both presidential terms. As a result, predictive margins have been computed to 
portray these changes. Figures 3 and 4 display approval—for the sitting president and 
economic management—by SES and ideology between 2006 and 2013. Evidently, 
results change between presidential administrations. If low SES respondents led 
support for both dependent variables under Bachelet, the group with a high SES 
had more positive views of Piñera. Additionally, predictive margins show how 
ideology drastically changed from one term to the other, as left-leaning respondents 
led approval between 2006 and 2009, while right-leaning groups did so between 
2010 and 2013.
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Table 3 
Logistic regression model for presidential approval, 2010-2013.
Predictors
2010 2011 2012 2013
Logit coeff Odds ratio Logit coeff Odds ratio Logit coeff Odds ratio Logit coeff Odds ratio
Sex
(Men)
Women
0.0895 1.094 0.0554 1.057 -0.0200 0.980 0.0665 1.069
(0.0948) (0.104) (0.107) (0.113) (0.0837) (0.0820) (0.0995) (0.106)
 
 
Age
(55+)
 
 
18-24
-0.409*** 0.664*** -0.588*** 0.555*** -0.478*** 0.620*** 0.0350 1.036
(0.155) (0.103) (0.180) (0.0998) (0.135) (0.0836) (0.159) (0.165)
25-34
-0.224 0.799 -0.325** 0.722** -0.441*** 0.643*** -0.122 0.885
(0.142) (0.113) (0.155) (0.112) (0.125) (0.0806) (0.151) (0.134)
35-54
-0.175 0.839 -0.431*** 0.650*** -0.433*** 0.648*** -0.206* 0.814*
(0.110) (0.0925) (0.127) (0.0826) (0.0986) (0.0639) (0.115) (0.0938)
Region
(Others)
Santiago
-0.348*** 0.706*** -0.252** 0.777** -0.181** 0.834** -0.235** 0.791**
(0.0963) (0.0680) (0.109) (0.0849) (0.0870) (0.0726) (0.102) (0.0807)
 
SES
(Low)
 
 
 
Middle
0.0982 1.103 0.170 1.185 -0.120 0.887 0.262*** 1.300***
(0.0952) (0.105) (0.110) (0.130) (0.0861) (0.0764) (0.101) (0.131)
High
0.316 1.371 0.569** 1.766** 0.302 1.353 0.610* 1.840*
(0.335) (0.459) (0.242) (0.427) (0.221) (0.299) (0.319) (0.587)
Right
1.619*** 5.047*** 1.490*** 4.437*** 1.953*** 7.053*** 2.259*** 9.572***
(0.135) (0.683) (0.128) (0.569) (0.112) (0.787) (0.161) (1.543)
Ideology
(None)
 
 
Center
0.450*** 1.568*** 0.377** 1.458** 0.411*** 1.508*** 0.403*** 1.496***
(0.124) (0.195) (0.148) (0.216) (0.117) (0.177) (0.140) (0.209)
Left
-0.760*** 0.468*** -1.390*** 0.249*** -0.973*** 0.378*** -0.796*** 0.451***
(0.135) (0.0631) (0.201) (0.0500) (0.130) (0.0491) (0.145) (0.0653)
 
Sociotropic
(Worse)
 
Same
0.375*** 1.455*** 0.961*** 2.613*** 0.720*** 2.055*** 0.866*** 2.378***
(0.116) (0.168) (0.142) (0.370) (0.110) (0.226) (0.133) (0.316)
Better
1.002*** 2.723*** 1.315*** 3.724*** 1.416*** 4.122*** 1.948*** 7.015***
(0.157) (0.428) (0.172) (0.642) (0.130) (0.537) (0.158) (1.106)
 
Sociotropic pro
(Worse)
 
Same
0.300* 1.350* 0.345* 1.412* 0.518*** 1.679*** -0.608*** 0.545***
(0.172) (0.232) (0.179) (0.252) (0.157) (0.263) (0.177) (0.0963)
Better
1.314*** 3.719*** 1.294*** 3.647*** 1.060*** 2.887*** -0.408** 0.665**
(0.179) (0.666) (0.192) (0.700) (0.168) (0.485) (0.193) (0.128)
 
Egotropic
(Worse)
 
Same
0.261** 1.298** 0.285* 1.330* 0.0111 1.011 0.0799 1.083
(0.118) (0.154) (0.151) (0.201) (0.113) (0.114) (0.133) (0.144)
Better
0.380** 1.462** 0.458*** 1.581*** 0.404*** 1.498*** 0.141 1.151
(0.155) (0.227) (0.173) (0.274) (0.134) (0.201) (0.164) (0.189)
 
Egotropic pro
(Worse)
 
Same
0.441** 1.555** 0.260 1.296 0.372** 1.450** -0.234 0.791
(0.199) (0.310) (0.203) (0.263) (0.175) (0.254) (0.201) (0.159)
Better
0.784*** 2.190*** 0.611*** 1.841*** 0.764*** 2.147*** -0.147 0.863
(0.206) (0.452) (0.210) (0.388) (0.181) (0.389) (0.209) (0.181)
Constant -0,249
-2.125*** 0.119*** -3.120*** 0.0441*** -2.729*** 0.0653*** -1.324*** 0.266***
(0.0297) (0.268) (0.0118) (0.227) (0.0148) (0.260) (0.0692)
Observations 2,659 2,659 2,828 2,828 4,158 4,158 2,681 2,681
Pseudo r2 0.214 0.214 0.250 0.250 0.234 0.234 0.209 0.209
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Author’s elaboration of data from www.cepchile.cl
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Table 4 
Logistic regression model for government management of the economy, 2010-2013.
Predictors
2010 2011 2012 2013
Logit coeff Odds ratio Logit coeff Odds ratio Logit coeff Odds ratio Logit coeff Odds ratio
Sex
(Men)
Women
0.0854 1.089 -0.0894 0.914 -0.170** 0.844** -0.0218 0.978
(0.0949) (0.103) (0.110) (0.101) (0.0840) (0.0709) (0.102) (0.0994)
 
 
Age
(55+)
 
 
18-24
-0.371** 0.690** -0.525*** 0.592*** -0.440*** 0.644*** -0.0335 0.967
(0.156) (0.107) (0.184) (0.109) (0.136) (0.0879) (0.163) (0.157)
25-34
-0.147 0.864 -0.350** 0.704** -0.381*** 0.683*** -0.250 0.778
(0.141) (0.122) (0.162) (0.114) (0.128) (0.0872) (0.156) (0.122)
35-54
-0.181 0.835 -0.393*** 0.675*** -0.257*** 0.774*** -0.278** 0.758**
(0.111) (0.0924) (0.132) (0.0891) (0.0993) (0.0768) (0.118) (0.0896)
Region
(Others)
Santiago
-0.188* 0.829* -0.352*** 0.703*** -0.0266 0.974 -0.141 0.869
(0.0964) (0.0799) (0.114) (0.0802) (0.0872) (0.0850) (0.104) (0.0903)
 
SES
(Low)
 
 
 
Middle
0.200** 1.221** 0.247** 1.281** 0.113 1.119 0.374*** 1.453***
(0.0954) (0.117) (0.114) (0.146) (0.0870) (0.0974) (0.104) (0.151)
High
0.191 1.210 0.819*** 2.269*** 0.744*** 2.104*** 0.380 1.462
(0.321) (0.388) (0.247) (0.561) (0.219) (0.461) (0.319) (0.467)
Right
1.405*** 4.077*** 1.635*** 5.131*** 1.835*** 6.264*** 1.985*** 7.277***
(0.127) (0.519) (0.133) (0.684) (0.111) (0.696) (0.153) (1.114)
Ideology
(None)
 
 
Center
0.359*** 1.432*** 0.660*** 1.935*** 0.506*** 1.659*** 0.644*** 1.903***
(0.127) (0.182) (0.153) (0.296) (0.120) (0.199) (0.142) (0.270)
Left
-0.455*** 0.634*** -0.811*** 0.444*** -0.549*** 0.577*** -0.788*** 0.455***
(0.135) (0.0857) (0.183) (0.0811) (0.122) (0.0702) (0.151) (0.0685)
 
Sociotropic
(Worse)
 
Same
0.413*** 1.512*** 1.078*** 2.938*** 0.773*** 2.167*** 0.908*** 2.479***
(0.119) (0.179) (0.153) (0.448) (0.114) (0.248) (0.139) (0.345)
Better
1.000*** 2.718*** 1.647*** 5.192*** 1.607*** 4.986*** 2.045*** 7.727***
(0.156) (0.424) (0.179) (0.929) (0.132) (0.656) (0.162) (1.250)
 
Sociotropic pro
(Worse)
 
Same
0.435** 1.545** 0.0993 1.104 0.528*** 1.695*** -0.816*** 0.442***
(0.184) (0.284) (0.180) (0.199) (0.162) (0.274) (0.179) (0.0790)
Better
1.511*** 4.531*** 0.965*** 2.625*** 1.174*** 3.236*** -0.637*** 0.529***
(0.189) (0.856) (0.193) (0.506) (0.172) (0.557) (0.195) (0.103)
 
Egotropic
(Worse)
 
Same
0.192 1.211 0.227 1.255 0.147 1.158 0.240* 1.271*
(0.120) (0.145) (0.160) (0.201) (0.117) (0.136) (0.141) (0.179)
Better
0.401*** 1.493*** 0.737*** 2.090*** 0.435*** 1.545*** 0.553*** 1.738***
(0.154) (0.230) (0.178) (0.373) (0.137) (0.211) (0.168) (0.292)
 
Egotropic pro
(Worse)
 
Same
0.216 1.241 0.309 1.362 0.243 1.275 -0.298 0.742
(0.203) (0.251) (0.217) (0.295) (0.176) (0.224) (0.205) (0.152)
Better
0.556*** 1.743*** 0.682*** 1.979*** 0.514*** 1.672*** -0.164 0.849
(0.209) (0.364) (0.223) (0.441) (0.182) (0.304) (0.214) (0.181)
Constant (0.258)
-2.423*** 0.0887*** -3.336*** 0.0356*** -3.077*** 0.0461*** -1.439*** 0.237***
(0.0229) (0.283) (0.0101) (0.235) (0.0108) (0.266) (0.0631)
Observations 2,659 2,659 2,828 2,828 4,158 4,158 2,681 2,681
Pseudo r2 0.199 0.199 0.269 0.269 0.231 0.231 0.223 0.223
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Author’s elaboration of data from www.cepchile.cl
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Figure 3 
Predictive margins for socioeconomic status, 2006-2013 (95% C.I).
 
Source: Author’s elaboration of data from www.cepchile.cl
Figure 4 
Predictive margins for political ideology, 2006-2013 (95% C.I).
 
Source: Author’s elaboration of data from www.cepchile.cl
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Conclusion
Studies on the economic vote have mainly focused on developed democracies, 
leaving aside the effects that economic performance holds in different settings. This 
paper focuses on the case of Chile between 2006 and 2014. Since 2006, Chileans 
have experienced different economic settings, which include a recession and a 
period of ensuing growth. However, economic performance did not translate into 
support or disapproval for sitting presidents. On the contrary, Bachelet’s popularity 
skyrocketed in the midst of an economic crisis, while Piñera’s approval drastically 
fell when the economy was doing well. A similar outcome took place for views on 
the government’s handling of the economy. Hence, Chileans did not necessarily 
distinguish between the role of the president and the government’s management of 
the economy. There were, however, relevant differences when comparing regression 
models between and within presidential administrations.
Logistic regression output for Michelle Bachelet (2006-2009) established that sex 
was a significant predictor for presidential approval, particularly between 2007 and 
2009. Women had greater odds than men of backing the president. Yet, this was not 
the case for the government’s handling of the economy, where the sex predictor 
failed to be significant. Furthermore, sex was neither a relevant determinant for 
presidential approval nor for the government’s management of the economy during 
the Piñera administration.
Age had a similar effect for both dependent variables during Bachelet’s first year in 
office, but starting in 2007, the predictor was more important to explain support 
for the government’s handling of the economy rather than presidential approval. 
Likewise, age exhibited a similar distribution of results for the Piñera administration, 
though the predictor turned out to have a better fit for presidential approval.
Region of residence behaved in a similar manner across both presidencies. President 
Bachelet and her government’s handling of the economy were less popular among 
Santiago residents than elsewhere in the country. Those who lived in regions tended 
to be more supportive of the president and, less so, the government’s economic 
policies under Piñera.
Socioeconomic status was one of the predictors that changed the most between 
presidential terms. The low SES group led backing for the president and the 
government’s handling of the economy between 2006 and 2009. Support for the 
president and economic management were greater among respondents with a 
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high SES between 2010 and 2013. The predictor had greater explanatory power 
for presidential approval than for support for the government’s management 
of the economy between 2006 and 2009, while it had a better fit for economic 
management during the Piñera administration.
Political ideology was another predictor that radically changed between presidential 
administrations. Respondents that self-identified with the left led support for 
Bachelet. Though to a lesser extent, the same happened among respondents that 
identified with the center. Respondents that self-identified with the right were 
the least likely to approve of the president between 2006 and 2009. The opposite 
was observed during the Piñera administration, when support was greater among 
respondents self-identified with the right and—to a lesser extent—among those 
identified with the center. Left-leaning respondents displayed the least backing for 
the president and the governments’ handling of the economy between 2010 and 
2013. Interestingly, the ideological predictor had greater explanatory power for 
presidential approval than for economic management between 2006 and 2013.
Economic outlook exhibited similar outcomes between 2006 and 2013. Sociotropic 
views, present and prospective, outweighed egotropic ones in all regression 
models. Economic outlook displayed greater explanatory power for government 
management of the economy in comparison to presidential approval.
This paper provides further light on vote-popularity functions in the context of 
emerging democracies. It does so by highlighting the limited effect that economic 
performance had on public opinion between 2006 and 2013, and by establishing the 
similar patterns that exist when respondents evaluated the president’s job performance 
and the government’s management of the economy. Yet various questions remained 
unanswered. Future research should focus on how respondents form their opinions 
on economic performance, and on which indicators—preferably through cross-
national studies—most influence their attitudes.
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